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Abstract: We utilize contemporary cognitive and social science of religion to
defend a controversial thesis: the human cognitive apparatus gratuitously inclines
humans to religious activity oriented around entities other than the God of classical
theism. Using this thesis, we update and defend two arguments drawn from David
Hume: (i) the argument from idolatry, which argues that the God of classical theism
does not exist, and (ii) the argument from indifference, which argues that if the God
of classical theism exists, God is indiﬀerent to our religious activity.
Introduction
Let’s say that idolatry is religious activity centred on a real or imagined
entity other than the God of classical theism. While idolatry has often been dis-
cussed as an accusation lodged by one religion against another, we introduce,
develop, and defend two irreligious arguments, originating with David Hume, util-
izing idolatry, which we call the ‘argument from idolatry’ and the ‘argument from
indiﬀerence’. Both suppose that if God desired for humans not to be idolatrous,
the human cognitive apparatus would not gratuitously incline humans to idolatry.
The two arguments diﬀer on whether classical theism entails that God desires for
us not to be idolatrous. The argument from idolatry supposes the god of classical
theism would desire for us to avoid idolatry; in that case, our gratuitous natural
inclination to idolatry entails that no such god exists. In contrast, according to
the argument from indiﬀerence, classical theism does not entail that God would
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desire for us to avoid idolatry; the argument concludes that God does not care
whether we avoid idolatry.
In the next two sections, we oﬀer the arguments from idolatry and indiﬀerence.
Then, we begin our discussion of Hume’s psychology of religion and relate Hume’s
theory of action to two general categories of religious activity: superstition and
enthusiasm. The following section oﬀers an interpretation of superstition, while
updating and vindicating Hume’s account with work in the social scientiﬁc
study of religion. Likewise, the subsequent section oﬀers an interpretation of
enthusiasm and, again, updates Hume’s account. We reinterpret superstition
and enthusiasm as two widespread, signiﬁcant, natural tendencies (a superstitious
tendency and an enthusiastic tendency) and suggest that both produce (or are)
gratuitous inclinations to idolatry.
The argument from idolatry
The elements comprising the arguments from idolatry and from indiﬀer-
ence are scattered throughout Hume’s corpus. We do not claim either argument
is explicitly oﬀered in any particular text. Nonetheless, the two arguments have
a distinctly Humean ﬂavour; previous authors have identiﬁed similar themes
(Siebert (); Holden (); De Cruz () ). Some of Hume’s discussion of
religion (e.g. in his Natural History of Religion and ‘Of Superstition and
Enthusiasm’) resembles early modern authors engaged in internecine religious
conﬂicts (e.g. Pocock () ). But, unlike his orthodox contemporaries, Hume
leaves little room for non-idolatrous religion. This is for good reason: for Hume,
non-idolatrous religion was not possible. Two possible consequences can be
drawn: either God does not exist (the argument from idolatry) or is indiﬀerent
to our religious activity (the argument from indiﬀerence). We begin with the argu-
ment from idolatry:
() If the God of classical theism exists, then God wants us to avoid
idolatry.
() If God wants us to avoid idolatry, then our cognitive apparatus does
not gratuitously incline us to idolatry.
() Our cognitive apparatus gratuitously inclines us to idolatry.
() So, God does not want us to avoid idolatry (modus tollens from 
and ).
() Therefore, the God of classical theism does not exist (modus tollens
from  and ).
Premise () is our most controversial and will again be utilized in the argument
from indiﬀerence. Therefore, we spend most of this article defending (). Likewise,
as we will describe, Hume devoted his attention to (). While we provide a more
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complete discussion of Hume’s psychology of religion in subsequent sections, we
brieﬂy summarize the argument here.
Hume argued that actions originate from a combination of passions, sensations,
and ideas (T ..; ..). Ideas and sensations are motivationally inert, but deter-
mine the conditions under which our passions arise. In turn, ideas aid our evalua-
tions of how to deliver on our ends, as provided by our passions. So, to have
actions motivated towards God, one must have an impression or an idea of
God. God is ‘no object of the senses or the imagination, and very little of the under-
standing’. Moreover, God is inﬁnitely remote and incomprehensible; one may ‘feel
no Aﬀection towards him’ (WC). We conceive of God as remote due to a combin-
ation of cognitive and cultural dispositions. Though psychologically disposed to
religion, humans elevate their deities until their deities can no longer generate pas-
sions. Finally, humans reorient their religious activity around non-transcendent
entities (NHR, especially section VIII). Thus, human psychology inclines people
to idolatry because their psychology inclines them to worship real or imagined
entities importantly unlike God. Having summarized the argument for () –
which we will momentarily return to in section IV – something needs to be said
with respect to () and (). Hume does not devote much time to defending
either, so we embark on a long digression.
While traditional theology has defended () in a variety of ways, the most con-
vincing argument for () appeals to the nature of love. We pump the relevant intui-
tions through a thought experiment. Suppose Pam tells us that Roy loves her.
Subsequently, we learn:
(i) Roy avoids Pam.
(ii) Pam spends her time with Jim, whom she thinks is Roy.
(iii) Roy knows Pam thinks Jim is Roy.
(iv) Roy has expended eﬀort in strengthening Pam’s belief that Jim is Roy.
From (i)–(iv), we should infer that, ceteris paribus, Pam is mistaken about Roy’s
feelings. Likewise, if God loves us, ceteris paribus, God would prefer for us to
engage God instead of surrogates in our religious activity and God would not
cause us to be disposed to mistake surrogates for God.
One reason (i)–(iv) are incompatible with Roy loving Pam is that Roy has
deceived Pam so that she is unable to respond appropriately to Jim or Roy.
Likewise, idolaters are unable to respond appropriately to God. Through relation-
ship with God, we could come to learn the Good and lead lives through God’s
teachings. To grow in relationship with God could involve moral maturation.
Those who have a mistaken view of who God is, what God desires for us, and
who are disabled from moral maturation can wreak incredible moral evil. (Note
that the appeal to moral error does not necessarily suggest a version of the
problem of evil. Here, our claim is that, ceteris paribus, God desires that we
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avoid moral error and that we strive towards moral maturity. This may be so even if
moral error is consistent with God’s goodness.)
Perhaps these reasons for accepting () – or the others we list in footnote  – are
not convincing, and perhaps no other convincing reasons can be provided. We will
consider the consequences of rejecting () when we turn to the argument from
indiﬀerence. For now, suppose () is true. Let’s turn to () (if God wants us to
avoid idolatry, then our cognitive apparatus does not gratuitously incline us to
idolatry). Here, we’ve modiﬁed Hume’s view and added the notion of a gratuitous
inclination. Whereas Hume believed that religious activity oriented around the
classical theistic God is not possible, we maintain the weaker thesis that religious
activity oriented around God is more diﬃcult (in a sense to be speciﬁed) than
expected on classical theism.
God may have countervailing desires overriding God’s desire for us to avoid
idolatry and may therefore allow some inclination to idolatry. For example, God
may recognize our free will as a great good. In order to allow us to have free-
will, God might have created us with fallible access to theological truths, and
that fallible access may incline some to idolatry. Those who love do not coerce
the beloved into relationship (or, if they do, this is a ﬂaw in the way that they
love; God lacks ﬂaws, so would not coerce us). Likewise, we ﬁnd it plausible
that, ceteris paribus, God would not coerce us into mistaking other entities (real
or imagined) for God. Consider again our thought experiment concerning Pam.
Suppose that one evening, while Pam is sleeping, Roy performs brain surgery
on Pam, so that Pam will be much more inclined to mistake Jim for Roy than
she would otherwise be. This would be yet stronger evidence that Roy does not
love Pam; Roy would have produced in Pam a gratuitous inclination to mistake
Jim for Roy.
A gratuitous inclination to idolatry is an inclination fulﬁlling at least one of two
conditions. An agent A is gratuitously inclined to idolatry if:
(v) due to A’s cognitive (and possibly social or economic) situation C, A is
more inclined to idolatry than is necessary for the attainment of some
overriding divine purpose or
(vi) in the case that God exists and created A, God would antecedently
know that if God created A such that C diﬀered, the world would cer-
tainly or probably be a better ﬁt for God’s purposes than the world
would otherwise be.
Here, we’ve adapted Kraay ()’s discussion of gratuitous evil in order to
develop our notion of a gratuitous inclination to idolatry. Nonetheless, gratuitous
inclinations to idolatry need not be gratuitous evils and our argument should not
be understood as an instance of an evidential argument from evil. This is so for two
reasons. First, God’s purposes in allowing or disallowing the degree to which A is
inclined to idolatry may not involve moral considerations and so may not involve
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considerations about goods or evils at all. The argument from idolatry might
simply involve considerations about, for example, God’s love. Or consider van
Inwagen (), where van Inwagen considers possible worlds where (a) there
are horrendous evils but God’s presence is known to all who are non-resistant
and (b) there are no horrendous evils but there are non-resistant non-believers.
If van Inwagen is right, it’s hard to see why we couldn’t similarly imagine worlds
where there are (a*) gratuitous evils but no gratuitous inclination to idolatry and
(b*) no gratuitous evils but there is gratuitous inclination to idolatry. If such
worlds are conceptually possible, then the gratuitous inclination to idolatry is
not necessarily an instance of gratuitous evil, and the incompatibility between
classical theism and gratuitous idolatry is not a concern about God’s distinctively
moral properties. Second, although idolatry may be bad for a variety of reasons (as
surveyed in note ), it is unclear whether an inclination to some bad activity is itself
bad; it is also unclear whether the badness is gratuitous whenever the inclination is
gratuitous.
Insofar as God is instrumentally rational, God’s design and providence should
reﬂect God’s will. Therefore, while there may be some tendency to idolatry even
in the case that God desires for us not to be idolatrous, the idolatry would not
be gratuitous. In this article, like Hume, we’ve focused on how people are contin-
gently cognitively arranged. Given other cognitive arrangements, humans would
have been less inclined to idolatry than they are, and, according to the argument
from idolatry, this is reason to think the classical theistic God does not exist.
The argument from indiﬀerence
As discussed previously, God might not desire for us to avoid idolatry;
perhaps () is false. Supposing () is false, () and () can be used to construct
the argument from indiﬀerence:
() If God wants us to avoid idolatry, then our cognitive apparatus does
not gratuitously incline us to idolatry.
() Our cognitive apparatus gratuitously inclines us to idolatry.
() Therefore, God does not want us to avoid idolatry.
Serious theological implications follow from (). Suppose classical theism is
true. The God of classical theism is perfectly good and perfectly loving. If a per-
fectly loving being would not want us to avoid idolatry, the concept of perfect
love must not entail that one would not incline one’s beloved to mistake others
for oneself. We’ve apparently gone wrong in how we’ve conceived of loving
relationships.
Moreover, as a perfectly good and loving being, ceteris paribus, God would
desire for Her creatures to experience good lives. So, if having theologically
correct beliefs oﬀered some unique route to important goods, ceteris paribus,
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God would desire for us to have theologically correct beliefs. If God does not desire
for us to avoid idolatry, then God does not desire for us to have theologically
correct beliefs; by implication, having theologically correct beliefs does not oﬀer
some unique route to important goods. Contrary to doctrines found in
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, theologically correct beliefs would not be a
unique route to, e.g., salvation, afterlife in God’s presence, a meaningful, purpose-
ful, or ethical life, and so on (Megill & Linford ()).
Remember Pam, Jim, and Roy. One reason Roy’s deception was taken to be
incompatible with Roy’s love was that Pam would have been disabled from
responding appropriately to Roy. This example seemed to suggest idolatry inhibits
proper relationship with God, inhibiting moral growth. But if a gratuitous inclin-
ation to idolatry does not inhibit moral growth, as suggested if God is indiﬀerent
to theological correctness, then moral growth is available regardless of one’s reli-
gious beliefs. The argument from indiﬀerence may provide new grounds for reli-
gious pluralism; if having theologically correct beliefs is not a unique route to
important goods, then membership in any particular religion is not important
for obtaining those goods.
Hume and our inclination to idolatry
Our arguments from idolatry and from indiﬀerence are intended as further
developments of arguments originating with Hume’s psychology of religion. For
the remainder of our article, we turn to explicating Hume’s defence of () – that
our cognitive apparatus inclines us to idolatry – and updating Hume’s defence
in light of the contemporary social scientiﬁc study of religion. Hume discusses
two ‘corruptions of true religion’, ‘superstition’ and ‘enthusiasm’, resulting from
our cognitive inability to hold God as a proper object of the passions (SE ).
We are thereby inclined to idolatry. Hume left little room for other kinds of reli-
gious activity. While Hume’s Natural History of Religion traces religion’s ‘origin
in human nature’ (NHR Intro.), the focus is on an anthropology and history of
religion. Hume’s psychology of religion, especially its connection to Hume’s
theory of human action, needs to be constructed from what Hume says elsewhere.
For Hume, only the passions (and not reason) motivate action (T ..; ..);
therefore, to interpret Hume’s psychology of religion, we need to examine those
passions to which Hume attributed religious activity. The theme throughout is
that there is no passion whose object is a transcendent God.
Hume’s  letter to William Mure of Caldwell (WC) is crucial for understand-
ing the relationship between Hume’s action theory and account of religion. For
Hume, our emotions are more aroused by someone closer than by someone
further away. For example, we feel more sympathy for a neighbour than for a
distant stranger (T ..; ..). A remote and distant ancestor who left us
‘Estates & Honours, acquired with Virtue’ might be a ‘great Benefactor’, but we
cannot possibly ‘bear him any Aﬀection’ due to his remoteness. We have never
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encountered, through sense experience, anything like God. Neither the ‘Passions’
nor the ‘calm Aﬀections’ can operate ‘without the Assistance of the Senses, &
Imagination, or at least a more complete Knowledge of the Object than we have
of the Deity’. God is an inﬁnite, incomprehensible being, radically beyond the
ﬁnite experience or cognitive abilities of human beings; God cannot be
‘the natural Object of any Passion or Aﬀection’, because God is not an object of
the ‘Senses or Imagination’, and enters ‘very little of the Understanding’.
Therefore, a fortiori, our passions cannot be aroused by God (WC). Because a
remote, incomprehensible God cannot be the object of religious activity, Hume
argues that religious activity can originate in two ways: either religious individuals
invent subordinate beings who can be the objects of religious activity (as in super-
stition) or the object of religious activity is the self (as in enthusiasm). We discuss
these in turn.
Superstition
For Hume, superstitious religion is a response to an internal theological
tension. The Abrahamic religions teach that religious activity should be oriented
around a radically transcendent God. Simultaneously, the greater God’s tran-
scendence, the less God can be an object for the passions. Superstitions are
‘false religions’ originating in weakness, fear, melancholy, and ignorance, and
are immoral (SE ). Of these, only fear and melancholy (despair) are passions.
As Cohon interprets, the objects of direct passions – of which fear and melancholy
are examples – is the pleasure or pain we may experience (Cohon (), ).
Due to our weakness, the world can harm us in innumerable ways. Due to our
ignorance, we postulate and fear powerful, unseen invisible agents responsible
for various harms, real and imagined. To avoid experiencing harm, the supersti-
tious develop methods to appease the unseen forces; these unseen forces can
explain the natural phenomena that might do harm to us (SE ; NHR III.). To
placate the unseen agents, the unseen agents are praised and through praise ele-
vated until they vastly exceed the cognitive abilities of human beings. The many
unseen agents become a singular being of the ‘utmost bounds of perfection’
(NHR VIII.), whose properties – e.g. unity, simplicity – are categorically distinct
from anything in the material realm.
A radically elevated conception of God is unstable and unﬁt for ‘vulgar compre-
hension’. In order to orient religious activity around the incomprehensible, new
subordinate entities (angels, demigods, demons, saints, etc.) were introduced
(NHR VIII.); but the subordinate entities are idols. Alternatively, some religions
slide into worshipping artwork. This explains doctrinal prohibitions on
artwork. And so our cognitive architecture leads practitioners to replace a
remote, transcendent God with more immediately accessible surrogates.
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The empirical evidence
We defend three claims crucial for Hume’s account of superstition: (i) reli-
gious belief frequently originates with existential fears, (ii) humans have cognitive
limitations in conceiving of a transcendent being, and (iii) due to our cognitive lim-
itations, humans tend towards idolatry. We turn ﬁrst to the empirical evidence for
claims (ii) and (iii); afterwards, we turn to (i). We do not follow Hume in identifying
speciﬁc religions as monolithically superstitious. Instead, we maintain that the
phenomenon Hume identiﬁes as superstition is a signiﬁcant, widespread, and
natural psychological tendency, which may be found across a variety of religions,
and that gratuitously inclines the folk to idolatry.
For all we say here, careful academic theological study may aid people in rea-
soning about God and so reduce the degree to which they are inclined to idolatry.
However, most theists have not undergone careful theological study and most do
not have the time or resources to do so. We are speciﬁcally interested in the reli-
gious beliefs cognitively or contextually available for the folk. We can distinguish
two contexts of reasoning: theoretical reasoning – as employed in academic the-
ology – and the application of reason to concrete instances in ordinary life –
which we will call ‘practical reasoning’. Scientists studying religion now generally
accept, ‘as an empirically established fact’, that the folk use anthropomorphic God
concepts, diﬀering from ‘theologically correct’ conceptions, in practical reasoning
(Westh () ). Helen de Cruz has previously written on the relevance of Hume
to the scientiﬁc study of religion. As she describes, Hume was right to think theo-
logical correctness is diﬃcult to maintain. And yet folk religious beliefs are ‘easy to
acquire’ (de Cruz (), ). The result is what Pascal Boyer terms the ‘tragedy of
the theologian’ (Boyer (), –). Theologians might attempt to maintain
oﬃcial doctrines, but their work does not provide substance to which religiously
oriented passions coincide. Social scientists report that the folk endorse a kind
of ‘folk religion’, constructed in the gap between the pulpit and the pew, and
that exists ‘apart from and along-side the strictly theological and liturgical forms
of the ofﬁcial religion’ (Yoder (), ).
Among the most cognitively appealing beliefs, common in folk religions across
cultures, are those which involve anthropomorphic supernatural agents, such as
angels, protector spirits, or otherwise non-transcendent divine entities, who inter-
vene in otherwise threatening situations. For example, in the United States, wide-
spread belief in, and reports of visitation by, angels transcends institutional
religious boundaries and is found among those who have rejected traditional reli-
gions in favour of New Age practices (Draper & Baker () ). The cognitive
appeal of such agents makes ‘such beliefs likely to be adopted, as they are “imme-
diately relevant for human concerns” ’ (ibid., ).
Similarly, the folk are inclined to an anthropomorphic conception of God, espe-
cially in the context of cognitive load, even when they abstractly endorse classical
theism. According to cognitive scientists Barrett and Keil (), the folk reason
inconsistently about the divine between abstract and practical reasoning.
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Abstractly, the folk often say God possesses transcendent properties as described
by their theological traditions (including those properties included in classical
theism). Barrett and Keil found unanimous agreement among twenty-two
undergraduate and graduate students that ‘God can read minds, knows every-
thing, can perform multiple mental activities at the same time, does not need to
be near something to receive sensory information about it, and has non-natural
spatial properties’ (ibid., ). To examine how the students cognized God in a
practical context, and under conditions of cognitive load, they were provided
with a narrative recall task. In the task, the subjects were read short vignettes
concerning God’s involvement in particular situations. The vignettes are too
long to commit completely to memory. Subjects were later asked to recall the
vignette. Diﬀerences between the original vignette and the recalled vignette
reveal how subjects processed the vignettes and committed them to memory.
For example, one vignette concerns God answering two prayers, one the prayer
of a boy caught in a river (ibid., –). The story does not indicate whether
God answered the other prayer before the boy’s prayer. Someone who conceives
of God anthropomorphically might say God ﬁnished answering the ﬁrst prayer
before attending to the boy. Someone who consistently reasons about God in
non-anthropomorphic terms – as without limitations – may say God helped the
boy while simultaneously attending to the ﬁrst prayer. When asked to explain
the vignette, subjects typically indicated that God answered one prayer at a time.
In explaining other vignettes, subjects utilized an anthropomorphic conception
of God at odds with their theological traditions (and at odds with classical theism).
God is conceived as a special ‘Big Person’: ‘there was a strong tendency for subjects
to think of God [as] exhibiting human limitations’ (ibid.). Barrett and Keil
summarize:
subjects seemed to characterize God as having to be near something to receive sensory
information from it, not being able to attend diﬀerentially to competing sensory stimuli, per-
forming tasks sequentially and not in parallel, having a single or limited focus of attention,
moving from place to place, and sometimes standing or walking. (ibid., –)
Later work reproduced the eﬀect among Hindu and Muslim participants, from
India, with diverse gender, educational, and economic categories (Barrett () ).
While Barrett and Keil have their critics, the critics agree that anthropomorph-
ism is a common feature of religion. Moreover, theological incorrectness can take
forms other than anthropomorphism. For example, (Westh () ) provides
cross-cultural examples supporting Hume’s psychology of religion, in that the
folk either anthropomorphize God or conceptualize God in mundane, earthly
terms. The Maasai, for instance, ‘represent their god EnkAi in radically diﬀerent
ways in diﬀerent contexts’ (ibid., ). Mythically, EnkAi is ‘fully anthropomorphic,
even living among men in primeval times’. As Westh goes on to explain, ‘in trad-
itional hymns of prayer, [EnkAi] is identiﬁed variously with the sky, the earth and
with other elements of nature’ (ibid.; also see Olsson (), ). While the
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Maasai’s traditional hymns diﬀer from the mythical representation, in that the
hymns do not anthropomorphize God, they still identify EnkAi with mundane
experiences in common life (the sky, earth, and ‘other elements of nature’).
Westh appeals to Olsson’s ethnography to conclude that when the Maasai turn
to serious theological reﬂection, neither mythical nor hymnal representations
‘are considered to be literally true’ (Westh (), ). Olsson explains that ‘the
Maasai conclude from myth . . . that primeval man somehow had a direct experi-
ence of God and from this knew his nature, but what this experience really meant
is not known any more’. Consequently, ‘no human being . . . can know what God
used to be like’ (Olsson (), ).
Similarly, the Babylonian god Girra was ritualistically identiﬁed with ﬁre, but
understood to be anthropomorphic in ‘narrative texts’ (Westh (), ).
While non-anthropomorphic, ﬁre does not transcend common life, so the identiﬁ-
cation is consistent with Hume. ‘[I]n the context of the oﬃcial [Babylonian/
Assyrian] temple cult most gods lived in their temples, where they received daily
food oﬀerings, while in other contexts they were represented as immanent in
natural phenomena, or as anthropomorphic beings living in heaven’ (ibid.).
Similar conclusions can be reached for ancient Egyptian, Abrahamic religions,
and the ancient Greeks (Olsson (), –).
Further instances of religion oriented around this-worldly items can be oﬀered
and compared to Hume. For Atran and Sperber, supernatural entities need to be
related to mundane experience for belief retention and cultural transmission; reli-
gious beliefs are predictably counter-intuitive, but only in speciﬁc and minimal
ways. Minimally counter-intuitive beliefs about x depict x as violating only a
few expectations given by the ontological category in which x appears (Boyer
(), –). Importantly, ‘only to the degree that the [minimally counter-intui-
tive concepts] remain bridged to the everyday world can information be stored and
evoked in plausible grades’ (Atran & Sperber (), ). Justice and Lambert
() and Birky and Ball () suggest that people’s conceptions of God are
partly determined by the personalities of their parents. Barrett and Van Orman
() suggest that those who use images of God in worship anthropomorphize
God to a greater degree than those who do not. Many more examples could be
given (Guthrie () ). Theologians have sometimes maintained a similar point,
e.g. Marcus Borg’s discussion of fathers as improper (patriarchal) models of God
and then parents as appropriate models of God (Borg (), –, ).
Fear and the social scientiﬁc study of religion
We’ve established that humans have cognitive limitations in conceiving of a
transcendent being (claim ii) and that due to those limitations, humans tend
towards idolatry (claim iii). We turn to addressing claim (i): frequently, religious
belief originates with existential fears. For Hume, superstition originates with exist-
ential fears in a dangerous and uncertain world. Because of those fears, humans
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elevate the initial objects of their religious activity beyond their cognitive capaci-
ties. At that point, humans turn to surrogates. Intuitively, we think love of God
is an appropriate motivation for devotion to and worship of God. For Hume,
love of God cannot motivate religious activity. The object of love of God is God,
but Hume thought no passion could have God as the object. Fear provides an
alternative to love of God as a motivation for devotional and worshipful activity.
Recall the argument from our conception of love for the view that God would
not gratuitously incline us to idolatry. If Roy loves Pam, then Roy desires that
Pam is motivated to relationship with Roy out of love and not out of fear. A fortiori,
if we learn Roy rewired Pam’s brain so that Pam is more disposed than she would
otherwise be to enter relationship with Roy out of fear as opposed to love, we have
reason to think Roy does not love Pam. On our modiﬁed Humean account, while
we allow for the possibility that some people love God, a gratuitous disposition to
enter relationship with God out of fear is incompatible with classical theism, and
this is doubly so if the disposition to relate inappropriately to God results in theo-
logically incorrect beliefs.
The social scientiﬁc study of religion has long associated fear (or, more gener-
ally, anxiety) with religious belief. As Hume thought, people fear the harms that
powerful, unseen forces might do to them; people fear most that they will be
killed. To cope with their anxieties around death, many cultures have constructed
elaborate systems of rituals and venerations to appease powerful, unseen forces, or
to ensure their passage into an afterlife. As we argue in this section, devotional
and worshipful activity is often motivated by fear and oriented around accessible,
anthropomorphic conceptions of the divine.
Morton-Williams’s comments on Yoruba religion are helpful in illustrating some
implications of Hume’s psychology of religion. Yoruba cosmology divides the
world into three realms: Earth, Sky, and ile aiye, the house of the World, which
we inhabit. Earth and Sky are populated by unseen, powerful forces the Yoruba
either work with or against. Morton-Williams writes: ‘Life in the third cosmic
realm, ila aiye . . ., is good only when good relationships are maintained with
the gods and spirits of the other two’ (Morton-Williams (), ). Elsewhere,
Morton-Williams describes the Yoruba as ‘constantly on guard against [death]’.
The Yoruba ‘make sacriﬁces to the gods to gain their protection and avoid their
wrath’. While the Yoruba endorse several hundred gods, individuals worship the
few ‘concerned with him’ and ‘proper to [their] lineage’. Other deities are some-
times addressed in response to other anxieties: ‘The gods not only shield their wor-
shippers, they also give them the blessings Yoruba most value: long life, increasing
prosperity, and, above all, children’ (Morton-Williams (), –). The Yoruba
acknowledge a hierarchy of gods, overseen by the transcendent creator deity
Olurun (literally ‘Sky-Owner’, translated by Morton-Williams as ‘God’). Yet
Olurun has no cult on Earth, because – as Hume predicts – religious activity is
primarily focused on interactions with the subordinate deities (ibid., ).
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Consistent with Hume’s account, Yoruba religious activity is typically motivated
by anxieties associated with the lesser deities. The lesser deities can be unjust or
vengeful, but can be sated or placated through rituals or tattoos. If one ﬁnds
favour with the minor deities, the deities can provide the ‘blessing of children,
health, and, if their God-ordained fate permits it, wealth’ (Morton-Williams
(), ). The gods can be predictable and ‘the terriﬁed apprehension of
death . . . is eased by carefully watching for signs of their demands’ (Morton-
Williams (), ). Death is explained in a variety of ways, each involving power-
ful, unseen entities. Witchcraft explains the death of newborns (‘The Yoruba admit
that they fear witchcraft more than anything else’). Sango, the god of thunder,
causes lightning strikes. Sopona delivers small-pox epidemics (ibid.).
Contemporary cognitive science of religion similarly links anxiety or fear of
death to religious belief. We oﬀer some representative studies. Harding et al.
() used standard psychological instruments to measure death anxiety, death
acceptance, and religiosity (together with relevant controls) among  individuals
from an Episcopalian church in New York City. Death anxiety and death accept-
ance were negatively correlated; subjects who reported more anxiety about
death also reported that they were less accepting of the inevitability of death.
Belief in God, the afterlife, and gender were the only variables that explained
the variance in the death anxiety scores; only belief in God and the afterlife pre-
dicted the death acceptance scores (ibid., ). People who reported more cer-
tainty about God’s existence reported less anxiety and more acceptance of death.
Harding et al. did not record longitudinal data and cannot be used to establish
conclusively that religious belief lowers death anxiety and increases death accept-
ance, or that pre-existent death anxiety brings about heightened religious belief.
Nonetheless, the correlation identiﬁed by Harding et al. provides some evidence
that religious belief lowers anxiety, at least for those who already believe.
Plausibly, anxious individuals pursue activities they have found to be useful in
the past for relieving anxiety or which they have observed to be useful for
others. Therefore, theists who are anxious about death might be motivated to
pursue a deeper commitment to their faith. Some communities might make use
of the eﬀect. Whitehouse () provides ethnographic data suggesting
Melanesian initiation cults put their initiates through terrifying rituals (‘Rites of
Terror’) after which the initiates have a greater commitment to the group.
Norenzayan and Hansen () performed four experiments providing evidence
that fear of death motivates religious activity. According to Terror Management
Theory (TMT), ‘cultural worldviews, along with the desire to live up to the stan-
dards of one’s culture (i.e., self-esteem), serve as a primary psychological buﬀer
against the uniquely human awareness of death. If so, heightening such terror
(mortality salience) should increase the need to bolster these worldviews’ (ibid.,
). TMT predicts that subjects who have religious beliefs will report greater com-
mitment to those beliefs if exposed to a mortality salience stimulus, and will sim-
ultaneously report a stronger rejection of foreign religious notions. However,
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according to other theorists (and, for our purposes, Hume in particular), subjects
who are primed to think about death will report a strengthened commitment to the
existence of supernatural agents in general and will thus be more open to cultur-
ally foreign supernatural agents. The four experiments can be used to distinguish
empirically between TMT and Hume’s account, even though Norenzayan and
Hansen do not utilize their experiments for that purpose.
The ﬁrst two experiments were consistent with both TMT and Hume, while the
latter two support Hume over TMT. In the ﬁrst experiment, subjects reported a
statistically higher commitment both to their personal religion and to their
belief in God, as compared to a control group, when primed to think about
death. In the second experiment, subjects who were exposed to a mortality sali-
ence stimulus explained an unusual phenomenon (the eﬃcacy of prayer) with
general aﬃrmation of God’s existence and speciﬁc aﬃrmation of God’s role in
the phenomenon (God answers prayers). Subjects were more likely to report a the-
istic explanation for the eﬃcacy of prayer after having been primed to think about
death than they were when primed to think about religion (ibid., –).
Experiments three and four repeated experiment two, but replaced God with
culturally foreign supernatural agents: in experiment three, Buddha and, in experi-
ment four, supernatural agents that do not belong to any world religion (‘ancestral
Shamanic spirits’; ibid., –). The results were consistent with Hume but
inconsistent with TMT: mortality salience stimulus increases the propensity to
accept supernatural agents generally – even culturally foreign supernatural
agents – for individuals with a pre-existing proclivity to religious belief. Fear of
death motivated religious belief and not, as one might think, love of God. The
result is a gratuitous inclination to idolatry, in part, comprised by theologically
inappropriate reasons for relating to God and theologically incorrect beliefs.
Enthusiasm
Superstition is not the only form of idolatry that Hume discusses. Like
superstition, enthusiasm involves passions for which the object is something
other than the radically transcendent God. According to Pocock, ‘The Greek
enthousiasmos carries the Latinate meanings of infusion and inspiration: the in-
pouring or in-breathing of the divine, which comes to inhabit the person pos-
sessed’ (Pocock (), ). In Christian theology, one may experience the indwel-
ling of the Holy Spirit; thereby, one might be (ﬁguratively) infused with the divine.
Most early modern authors reserved ‘enthusiasm’ for radical protestant sects for
whom the (supposed) experience of the Holy Spirit was deemed politically disrup-
tive (ibid., ). On Hume’s account, ‘enthusiasm’ came to be identiﬁed with a
more general social or psychological phenomenon for explaining tendencies in
Protestant churches.
For Hume, positive emotions – such as personal success, health, conﬁdence,
boldness, and elation (Yandell (), –) – can result in what Pocock
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describes as the ‘self-deiﬁcation of the auto-intoxicated mind’ (Pocock (), ).
As Hume describes, the mind can be ‘subject to’ an elevation and a presumption
‘arising from prosperous spirits, luxurious health, strong spirits,’ or a ‘bold and
conﬁdent disposition’. Hume remarks the ‘imagination swells with great, but con-
fused conceptions, to which no sublunary beauties or enjoyments can correspond’
(SE ). One turns away from the Earthly realm, partaking in ‘raptures’, ‘trans-
ports’, and ‘surprising ﬂights of fancy’. Since these feelings go beyond what the
enthusiast understands as mundane sensations, they are attributed to God
(‘who [they think] is the object of devotion’; SE ). In the process, one comes
to see oneself as the special creation of God. Thereby, one becomes prideful.
Hume’s account of enthusiasm begins with the observation of ‘external [social]
events’, e.g. ‘prosperous success’, ‘luxuriant health’, but also ‘strong spirits’ and a
‘bold and conﬁdent disposition’ (Immerwahr (), –). Enthusiasm is
associated with hope, pride, presumption, ‘warm imagination’, and ignorance.
Of these, hope and pride are the only passions. Hope is a direct passion while
pride is an indirect passion. The object of hope is the pleasure we may have
from the thing hoped for (Cohon (), ). The object of pride is the self (or
perhaps an object related to the self, e.g. one’s child or a friend). For Hume, the
locution ‘self-love’ is confused; one cannot truly love the self, but one can be pride-
ful. Pride and love follow from a coupling of ideas and sensations. Love follows
from a pleasant sensation coupled with the idea of another person. Pride
follows from a pleasant sensation coupled with the self (T ...; ...).
Instead of worshiping a statue, a relic, or a lesser deity, enthusiasts are motivated
by pride to self-worship. Enthusiastic religion, then, is developed through a
general ignorance of our emotions and the source of our successes, and through
the inﬂuence of hope, pride, conﬁdence, and anthropomorphism.
The empirical evidence
As with superstition, we do not follow Hume in his thought that speciﬁc
religions are monolithically enthusiastic. Instead, we understand the phenomenon
Hume identiﬁes as enthusiasm as a widespread, signiﬁcant, and general psycho-
logical tendency (or disposition) gratuitously inclining people to idolatry. The
theological and popular religious literatures frequently claim that self-worship
results from a common variety of religious error. Religious authors have argued
that apostates chose to worship themselves in place of God (Plantinga (),
; MacArthur (), ) or that secular society is morally degraded because
people have placed themselves before God. (For a particularly vivid example of
the latter, see Scalia (), ch. .) Religious scriptures are replete with prohibi-
tions against self-worship and with instructions to abdicate oneself before God.
Could the common prohibition against prideful self-worship be a consequence
of the ease with which religious individuals slip into prideful self-worship?
Communities infrequently prohibit actions that do not occur among their
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members. The common occurrence of prohibitions against prideful self-worship
suggests that members of religious communities easily slip into self-worship
in acts of religious veneration. When interviewed, sociologists found that
some Christians attribute to atheists a self-interested egoism into which the
Christians fear the Christians might slip if they lost their faith (Edgell et al.
(), –). Psychologists have shown that self-esteem correlates with
one’s conception of God. Benson and Spilka () studied  Catholics; those
with high self-esteem tended to posit a loving and accepting God. As Hume
writes, one’s ‘bold and conﬁdent disposition’ may play a causal role in explaining
one’s conception of God. Perhaps the object of the emotions inclining some to reli-
gious activity is the self. And if all that is right, many are gratuitously inclined to
idolatry.
Conclusion
Hume discusses two forms of idolatry (superstition and enthusiasm) gener-
ating the arguments from idolatry and indiﬀerence. Both result from our cognitive
inability for God to be the object of our passions. Only passions can motivate, so
religious activity must originate elsewhere than God. The superstitious worship
non-transcendent, anthropomorphic entities because a transcendent being far
exceeds our cognitive abilities. The enthusiasts worship themselves in disguise.
Some are moved to religious activity by fear, whose object is pain, and others
worship idols or their passions are stirred by the self. Fear and pride are inappro-
priate motivations for religious activity and result in idolatry.
There are reasons to reject aspects of Hume’s psychology, epistemology, action
theory, his taxonomy of emotions (or passions), claims made about particular
religions, and so on. But if superstition and enthusiasm are reinterpreted as
two widespread, signiﬁcant, general tendencies gratuitously inclining people to
idolatry, core Humean claims are supported by empirical work in the scientiﬁc
study of religion; these core claims allowed us to construct the arguments from
idolatry and indiﬀerence. First, due to their psychologies, the folk hold crude
God concepts falling far short of classical theism. Much religion is oriented
around either lesser divine beings or crude anthropomorphisms. Second,
Hume suggests humans are cognitively wired for idolatry. We endorse a
weaker version of this claim: for all we know, some humans avoid idolatry, but
humans have a gratuitous inclination to idolatry explained by their cognitive
architecture. Third, the human inclination to idolatry is partly explained by our
fears and prides, motivations inappropriate for devotional and worshipful behav-
iour. Our disposition to such behaviour is contrary to intuitive notions of love,
either suggesting that no loving God exists or that our conception of love requires
radical revision.
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Notes
. We understand classical theism as the view that there exists a unique, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibe-
nevolent, and inﬁnitely loving being who created everything other than herself.
. For the Abrahamic religions, idolatry is a terrible sin God commands us to avoid. And, as Nielsen sum-
marizes, ‘the Jewish andChristian creeds [make] it plain thatman lives not for himself alone butwas created
byGod for fellowshipwithHim.Man’s purpose involves the love andacknowledgement ofGod. To loveGod
is the fundamental reason for man’s existence’ (Nielsen (), ). Communion with God would bring us
into our greatest fulﬁlment and deepest good.Worshipping an idol, and so a falseGod, blocks the possibility
of such a relationship. We do not suppose these reasons to support () are exhaustive.
. An anonymous reviewer raised an objective to this thought experiment and the application to the argu-
ment from idolatry. They wrote,
[Pam] might have a satisfying relationship with Jim, all the while thinking she experiences this
with Roy. Likewise, [idolators] might have a satisfying relationship with [some entity other than
God], believing they love and worship God. If God is actively deceiving [the idolator] . . . then,
through no fault of their own, their love and worship are misdirected, but their feelings are
sincere.
According to the reviewer, since the believers’ feelings are sincere, some theists may argue that the ido-
lator’s misdirected love and worship are acceptable to God. However, the reviewer’s comment misses our
point. We are not concerned with God’s judgement of idolatry. Instead, we are concerned with God’s
instrumental rationality qua God’s perfect love. God would seek loving relationship, not because idol-
atrous behaviour is unacceptable to God, but because those who love seek relationship for love’s own
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sake. Moreover, as we explain, the argument from idolatry is not an argument from evil – that is, we are
not concerned with whether idolaters are satisﬁed with their religious beliefs. (Nonetheless, we ﬁnd plaus-
ible the thesis that if God exists, the greatest fulﬁlment would be achieved through relationship with God.)
. Kraay draws his second condition, which we adapt for our second condition, from Hasker (). The
notion of gratuitous evil originates with Rowe (). The analogy with gratuitous evil will incline many to
oﬀer some variation of sceptical theism in response. We have nothing original to contribute to the debate
on sceptical theism (as coined in Draper () ) in this article, but we do note that sceptical theism
remains controversial. Although we are convinced that sceptical theism has been successfully answered
(Wielenberg (), Idem (), Idem (); Wilks (); Hudson (); Law (), Idem ();
Draper () ), convinced sceptical theists can reinterpret this article to demonstrate some consequences
of giving up sceptical theism or as a reductio of those theistic positions that deny sceptical theism.
. See Schellenberg (), –, for a similar line of argumentation concerning the relationship between
the divine hiddenness argument and the problem of evil.
. Van Inwagen’s thought experiments are meant to distinguish the problem of divine hiddenness from the
problem of evil. For van Inwagen, the problem of evil, but not the problem of divine hiddenness, can arise
in type (a) worlds while the problem of divine hiddenness, but not the problem of evil, can arise in type (b)
worlds.
. As an anonymous reviewer points out, some theists may object that though our cognitive apparatus is
contingently arranged, we ﬁnd the arrangement theology predicts. Reformed theology predicts that we
have a faculty for non-inferentially producing God-beliefs, i.e. the sensus divinitatis. Cognitive science of
religion has found that we have such a faculty, perhaps vindicating reformed theology (Clark & Barrett
(), (); Clark (); Barrett (), –; for a critical response, see Shook () ). We
respond in three ways.
First, while Clark and Barrett are right that reformed theology predicts the general fact that we possess
some cognitive faculty for non-inferentially producing God beliefs, they have not considered whether the
particular facts concerning our God-belief faculty are plausible given theism. That is, Clark and Barrett
commit what Paul Draper calls the fallacy of understated evidence: they ‘successfully identify some general
fact about [our cognitive faculties] that is more probable given theism than given naturalism, but all too
conveniently ignore other more speciﬁc facts about that topic, facts that, given the general fact, are sign-
iﬁcantly more probable in naturalism than in theism’ (Draper (), –; also see Draper ();
Idem (); Lucas () ). The argument from idolatry suggests that one particular fact, i.e. our gra-
tuitous inclination to idolatry, is either implausible on classical theism or that God is indiﬀerent to idolatry
(in which case, e.g., much of traditional religion is wrongheaded).
Second, supposing reformed theology does predict the particular facts, pre-scientiﬁc reformed theolo-
gians (e.g. Calvin) had access to the same phenomenology available to religious practitioners now; we
should not be surprised if the phenomenology they discussed agrees with the phenomenology described
by cognitive science. (Cognitive scientists should worry if this were not the case!) Following the parallel
discussion of theodicy in Draper (), we should instead ask whether reformed theology is probable
given theism. If reformed theology is not probable given theism, then reformed theology’s ability to
predict the data will not substantially raise the probability of theism, given the data.
Third, Barrett () explains that humans process ideas about God diﬀerently under conditions of
cognitive load as a by-product of more general constraints imposed by cognitive eﬃciency. While cog-
nitive eﬃciency constraints may be inevitable in a naturalistic explanation of our God-belief producing
faculty, such constraints are problematic on a theistic model in which God providentially ensures our
God-belief producing faculty. Again, God could have endowed us with cognitive faculties allowing us to
process ideas about God eﬃciently and accurately even under conditions of cognitive load. Moreover,
Roubekas () argues that the ﬁndings in Barrett & Keil () might explain the Arian controversy: the
folk are predisposed against an orthodox understanding of the Trinity. This would be particularly sur-
prising if orthodox Christian theology were true because this would suggest that the folk are cognitively
wired so that they are more likely to hold a recognized heretical position from Christian theological
history.
. One might have thought religious activity was motivated by love of God; but since there cannot be a
passion whose object is God, and there cannot be actions unmotivated by passions, religious actions
cannot be brought about by love of God. Hume scholars agree with our interpretation. For example,
Thomas Holden cites passages to support the claim that human passions are not directed towards God
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(Holden (), ). According to Holden, Hume believed that ‘God is not merely currently unseen and
unknown [on Hume’s view] but “Invisib[le] and Incomprehensib[le]” ’, unrepresentable by human fac-
ulties (ibid., ). Hume maintained that ‘historical religions only succeed in engaging our passions insofar
as they present us with sensible forms that cannot be possibly identiﬁed with the ultimate ﬁrst cause or
designer’ (ibid., ). Likewise, Siebert and Holden interpret Hume to suggest that God is not the object of
any passion and that humans ﬁnd idolatry natural. According to Siebert, Hume argued that humans are
‘idolaters by nature’ (Siebert (), ). The incarnation of God in material objects is a kind of divine
simulacrum in the physical world enabling religious activity (ibid., –). For Holden, Hume’s work
implies an argument for moral atheism, according to which the Ultimate cause and sustainer of the
universe cannot be an object of moral evaluation (Holden (), ). We do not take a position on
whether Holden’s interpretation of Hume as a ‘moral atheist’ is correct or if Hume advanced the various
arguments Holden believes to be implicit in Hume’s work. Nonetheless, we note that our article is con-
sistent with and mutually supportive of Holden’s interpretation.
. Throughout the Natural History, various pagan religions, such as the ancient Greeks (NHR IX.) and
Egyptians (NHR IX.), are identiﬁed as superstitions. For Hume, Catholicism is another superstition.
Hume’s claim that Catholicism is a superstition echoes previous Protestant critiques, but as discussed
below, Hume equally takes aim at Protestants. In Hume’s History of England, he discusses either the
‘catholic superstition’ (HE XXXIII ) or the ‘Romish superstition’ (HE XXXIV ; ). Throughout his
Natural History, Hume identiﬁes particular Catholic practices – such as the Eucharist (NHR XII.–) and
the veneration of saints (NHR X.) – as superstitions. In his Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Hume argues
that superstitions elevate their clergy to higher statuses than other religions elevate their clergy. Given too
high a standing, clergy are prone to political corruption. Priests elevated into positions of high authority
become tyrants, their actions resulting in endless religious wars (SE –). Hume asserts the Jesuits have
become tyrants in France and identiﬁes speciﬁc groups of Catholics, such as the Molinists, as examples of
the superstitious. The one notable exception are the Jansenists, whomHume identiﬁes as preserving ‘alive
the small sparks of the love of liberty’ in France (SE ).
. We interpret Hume’s ‘melancholy’ as interchangeable with Hume’s ‘despair’, as described in his Treatise.
. As expected from his letter to Mure, superstition does not arise from some indirect passion whose object is
God.
. Hume notes that Jews and ‘Mahometans’ (Muslims) ban all ‘the arts of statuary and painting, and [do not
allow] the representations, even of human ﬁgures, to be taken by marble or colours; lest the common
inﬁrmity of mankind should produce idolatry’ (ibid.). Religions allowing statuary, painting, and other
representations become idolatrous because God is not the actual object of their worship. Hume pre-
sumably has in mind the Catholics, whom the Protestants had condemned for their idolatry (saints,
statues of the Virgin Mary, etc.). Hume tells us that the idols of the Catholics are at least as bad as those of
pagans: ‘But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkeys? says the learned doctor. They are at
least as good as the relics or rotten bones of martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist’ (NHR XII.).
. For a book length discussion, see Slone ().
. Elsewhere, De Cruz arrives at a view distinct from Boyer’s, but not in ways relevant for our purposes. See
De Cruz ().
. God is inﬁnite, perfect, limitless, omnipotent, unchanging, non-material, omniscient, and so on.
. We’ve described the questionnaire and narrative recall tasks as if Barrett and Keil performed them in a
particular order. Barrett and Keil explain that they reversed the ordering to control for possible priming
eﬀects (Barrett & Keil (), ).
. For overviews, see Boyer () and Atran (), ch. .
. In cultures that do not have an explicit belief in an afterlife for particular persons, people have often
believed in a diﬀerent kind of future life, for example, that their society continues after their death. For
example, Tabor () discusses ancient Israelite religion, in which Israelite religion ‘functioned very well
[without the idea of an eternal life in heaven] for more than a thousand years’. According to Tabor, various
rituals and practices were constructed to ﬁnd favour with Yahweh.
. For reviews on data linking religion and fear of death, see Ellis & Wahab (); Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi
(), –; for psychological literature linking anxiety and religious belief, see Koenig (), –,
–.
. An important caveat: Harding et al. only compared Episcopalians, from a single church, with other
Episcopalians from the same church. One should not infer, for example, that atheists would be less
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anxious if exposed to more religion. Osarchuk and Tatz () found that, after subjects were exposed to
graphic death imagery, those who believed in an afterlife before the experiment reported a stronger belief
in the afterlife after the experiment. Among non-believers, Osarchuk and Tatz found no statistically
signiﬁcant changes. Similarly, Norenzayan and Hansen () found that subjects who report a prior
belief in supernatural agents germane to a particular religion (e.g. the Abrahamic God), when primed to
think about death, report ‘stronger belief in supernatural agents’ (ibid., ), even if the agents are cul-
turally foreign. However, the beliefs of non-religious individuals remained unchanged, whether for cul-
turally germane or culturally foreign supernatural agents.
. One might have thought, since the imagination swelled with some ‘confused conception’ corresponding
to nothing in the Earthly (‘sublunary’) realm, Hume is describing the enthusiast’s conception of God.
However, in light of the letter to Mure, the object of the ‘confused conception’ must be something other
than God. Perhaps enthusiasm should be understood as a kind of madness arising from the inability for
God to be the object of one’s love (‘the fanatic madman delivers himself over, blindly and without reserve,
to the supposed illapses of the Spirit and to inspiration from above’; SE ).
. Contrary to the interpretation we’ve provided, Hume sometimes suggests a degraded form of God as the
object of the passions involved in enthusiasm. For example, Hume writes that hope and fear ‘agitate [the
enthusiast’s] breast when [enthusiasts] think of the Deity’, so they ‘degrade [God] into a resemblance with
themselves’ and thereby render God ‘more comprehensible’, or they may ‘exult with Vanity in esteeming
themselves [God’s] peculiar Favourites’ (WC ). Again, worshipping a more comprehensible idol in place
of God is a central theme. Earlier, we attributed to Hume the view that the object of enthusiasm is the self.
Here, Hume seems to say that the object of enthusiasm is either the self or a degraded form of God. The
two interpretations might be reconciled if the degraded form of God is taken to be the self, or one might
interpret Hume as changing his view over time. On the other hand, note that if the passions involved in
enthusiasm do involve a degraded form of God as the object, Hume’s conception of enthusiasm may still
be empirically supported by appealing to the experiments discussed in the section on superstition.
. Biblical scholars have argued that prohibitions discussed in the Bible provide a glimpse into which sorts of
transgressions were commonplace in ancient Israel, e.g. Dever (), –.
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